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“This Immense Expense 
of Art”: George Eliot 
and John Ruskin on 
Consumption and the 
Limits of Sympathy
E m I L y  C o I T
	 “≠y own money buys me nothing 
but an uneasy conscience,” frets the heroine of George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch (1871).1 But the novel in which Dorothea’s uneasi-
ness about money features so centrally also expresses a political 
conservatism that prefers to preserve rather than redistribute 
concentrations of accumulated wealth. Critics have discussed 
George Eliot’s conservatism at length; in this essay I attempt 
to better our understanding of it by examining a body of ideas 
about consumption and moral obligation that she and John 
Ruskin share.2 I use a discussion of consumer ethics to explore 
Nineteenth-Century Literature, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 214–245. ISSN: 0891–9356, online ISSN: 1067–
8352. © 2010 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct 
all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University 
of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/ 
rights.htm.
1	 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. David Carroll (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 
364. Subsequent references in the text refer to this edition.
2	 most analyses of Eliot’s politics have focused on Felix Holt, the Radical (1866). See 
Linda Bamber, “Self-Defeating Politics in George Eliot’s Felix Holt,” Victorian Studies, 18 
(1975), 419–35; Rosemarie Bodenheimer, The Politics of Story in Victorian Social Fiction 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988); Catherine Gallagher, The Industrial Reformation of 
English Fiction: Social Discourse and Narrative Form, 1832–1867 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
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the moral logic of Eliot’s and Ruskin’s conservatism by exam-
ining the role of the aesthetic within it. Economic consump-
tion and the aesthetic are subjects inextricably connected, not 
just because the discourses of political economy and aesthetics 
have a shared origin in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, 
but also because the discourse of aesthetics has long served to 
legitimize select modes and acts of consumption.3 To discuss 
money and art in the same breath is perfectly natural from the 
Ruskinian perspective that sees society as an organic unity of 
interdependent parts, a system within which beauty, creative 
production, governance, and commercial exchange are not 
separable matters.
Eliot’s similar perception of society as an interconnected 
web allows her, like Ruskin, to see consumption as a mode of 
interacting with other human beings and thus a crucial site for 
moral thought and action. She addresses the question of how 
to spend money because that question is one formulation of a 
larger and more general problem: how are we to balance our 
own needs and desires with those of others? Eliot advocates a 
moral awareness that makes one sensitive to the pain of others 
Press, 1985); Nancy Henry, “George Eliot and Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to George Eliot, ed. George Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 
138–58; Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780–1950 (London: Chatto and Win-
dus, 1958); and Ruth Bernard yeazell, “Why Political Novels Have Heroines: Sybil, Mary 
Barton, and Felix Holt,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction, 18 (1985), 126–44.
3	 John Guillory exposes the shared origins of these two discourses “separated at 
birth,” and shows that idea of the “work of art” has its historical beginnings in “the un-
easiness of the first consumer society with the lack of any systematic regulation of con-
sumption” (Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation [Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993], pp. 303, 307). Eighteenth-century moral philosophers, 
he writes, found in the idea of taste “a means of checking the greed and social irrespon-
sibility which were historically associated with ‘luxury,’ with uncontrolled consumption” 
(Cultural Capital, p. 307). For more on the relation between the discourses of aesthetics 
and political economy, see Regenia Gagnier’s study of their parallel development dur-
ing the nineteenth century, and mary Poovey’s account of the formation of literary and 
economic genres (see Gagnier, The Insatiability of Human Wants: Economics and Aesthetics 
in Market Society [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000]; and Poovey, Genres of the Credit 
Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain [Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 2008]). For valuable political histories of the aesthetic, see Guillory, 
Cultural Capital; Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (malden, mass.: Blackwell, 
1990); and martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of 
Aesthetics (New york: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994).
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up until the point where—as when we hear the grass grow and 
the squirrel’s heart beat—such awareness becomes intolerable 
and counterproductive. For her the selfishness that causes ex-
cessive or improper consumption is the selfishness that comes 
from the numbing of that moral awareness. The treatment of 
consumption in Middlemarch, I argue, is an important articula-
tion of Eliot’s moral thought. It is also an attempt to address 
the great unresolved problem within her moral program: if it is 
untenable to feel sympathy for every person at every moment, 
then where can we in good conscience let sympathy stop? Eliot 
suggests that aesthetic pleasure can make consumption mor-
ally defensible, but she also anticipates Pierre Bourdieu’s cri-
tique of the aesthetic: her novel represents both the display of 
cultural capital and the exercise of the aesthetic disposition as 
ways of maintaining social and economic hierarchies.4 She thus 
at once critiques and participates in the system within which 
the aesthetic functions to preserve social and political stasis.
Eliot and Ruskin write in the context of an industrial so-
ciety in which consumption has rapidly increasing social and 
economic importance. one of Ruskin’s prescient strokes as an 
economic writer is to adopt a framework of abundance rather 
than scarcity, and thus to direct attention to the problem of con-
sumption rather than production; in doing so, he presages both 
the accelerating spread of consumer culture and the insights of 
4	 Pierre Bourdieu’s studies of class, habitus, and distinction are part of a robust 
body of literature on the social significance of consumer objects and behaviors; see 
Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cam-
bridge, mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984). Thorstein Veblen’s analysis in The Theory 
of the Leisure Class (1899) of emulative spending and “conspicuous consumption” fo-
cuses, like Bourdieu’s work, on the ways consumption relates to status and power; see 
in particular his comments on aesthetics and consumption in Veblen, The Theory of 
the Leisure Class (New york: Penguin, 1994), pp. 126–35. Jean Baudrillard’s work on 
consumer culture and consumer society describes a “system of objects” in which com-
modities function as signs; see Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, 
trans. Chris Turner (Thousand oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998); and Baudrillard, The System 
of Objects, trans. James Benedict (London and New york: Verso, 2006). mary Douglas 
describes the significative function of consumer goods in a far more positive light; she 
sees consumer objects as an “information system” that humans use to communicate 
effectively. See in particular mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods: 
Towards an Anthropology of Consumption (New york: Routledge, 1996), pp. 37–66; and 
mary Douglas, “The Consumer’s Revolt,” in Thought Styles: Critical Essays on Good Taste 
(Thousand oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), pp. 106–25.
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the marginal revolution.5 Unlike the neoclassical economists 
of that movement, however, Ruskin objects vociferously to the 
fundamental premises of the science he discusses: most signifi-
cant, he objects to the abstraction of economic questions in iso-
lation from moral concerns and social realities.6 Ruskin rede-
fines the basic terms of the science in order to reintegrate them 
into that human matrix. In this strategy we can see an analogue 
of Karl Polanyi’s concept of an “embedded” economy that is 
subordinate to social concerns rather than autonomous from 
them.7 Ruskin shares with Karl marx and marxist thinkers a 
theory of value based in labor and an interest in the conditions 
of production; in “The Nature of Gothic” (1853) Ruskin pres-
ents the clearest articulation of his belief that all labor should 
be creative labor, and that in a healthy society art production 
is indistinct from production at large. Ruskin’s concern for 
the quality of workers’ lives, however, does not translate into 
egalitarianism. Though in his earlier works of art criticism he 
5	 James Clark Sherburne identifies the “most important” among Ruskin’s principles 
of social criticism to be “his pioneering perception of the possibility of an abundance 
of good things for all men and his rejection of the usual Victorian belief that life is a 
struggle in which scarcity is the expected condition” (Sherburne, John Ruskin or the 
Ambiguities of Abundance: A Study in Social and Economic Criticism [Cambridge, mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press, 1972], p. 69). I agree with Sherburne’s argument, but I wish to draw 
attention to Ruskin’s anxiety about consuming in the present, before that “possibility 
of abundance” is realized.
6	 The political economists whom Ruskin singles out for attack—such as Adam Smith 
and, more extensively, John Stuart mill—were in fact sensitive and accomplished moral 
thinkers quite cognizant of the limitations of their science. Ruskin’s vitriol would have 
been more accurately pointed at the popularizers of political economy, who took the 
descriptive theoretical precepts of these incisive thinkers as prescriptive dogma. See John 
Tyree Fain, Ruskin and the Economists (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1956), p. 47; 
Alan Lee, “Ruskin and Political Economy: Unto this last,” in New Approaches to Ruskin: Thir-
teen Essays, ed. Robert Hewison (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 71–73; 
and Gagnier, The Insatiability of Human Wants, p. 62. Willie Henderson assesses Ruskin’s 
reading of mill and argues that what many perceive to be “unfairness” on Ruskin’s part 
can be attributed to stylistic differences between the two writers (see Henderson, John 
Ruskin’s Political Economy [London and New york: Routledge, 2000], pp. 107–24).
7	 Karl Polanyi sees industrial capitalism and its delusive belief in the supremacy of 
the economy and the market as anomalous in history; he argues that “man’s economy, 
as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships,” and describes the community-oriented 
practices of “reciprocity and redistribution” that generally govern human societies (see 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time [Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1944, 2001], pp. 49–58). Ruskin advocates such practices within the 
framework of a paternalistic government.
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embraces the ideal of an aesthetic democracy, he generally ad-
vocates a paternalistic government that recognizes different 
and mutually dependent roles for different persons.8 Neverthe-
less, Ruskin’s influence on thinkers and movements working 
variously for equality has been vast, and he is a foundational 
thinker in what John maynard Keynes called the “underworld” 
of economic thought, or the tradition working in opposition to 
the capitalist mainstream.9
Ruskin was not the first British thinker to see an oppor-
tunity for political action and expression in consumption.10 
But today he is hailed as “the founder of moral consumption” 
and recognized as an important early thinker in the ongoing 
effort to define and achieve ethical behavior in the context of 
consumer culture.11 His insistence that buyers consider the 
8	 Linda Dowling traces this move from aesthetic-democratic to paternalist in her 
investigation of the “Whig aesthetic paradox,” a study that bears upon much discussed 
here; she attributes Ruskin’s shift in part to his loss of faith in 1857 (see Dowling, The 
Vulgarization of Art: The Victorians and Aesthetic Democracy [Charlottesville: Univ. Press of 
Virginia, 1996], pp. 25–49). P. D. Anthony situates Ruskin in relation to William mor-
ris and to marxist thought (see Anthony, John Ruskin’s Labour: A Study of Ruskin’s Social 
Theory [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983]). Williams gives a brief analysis of 
his paternalism (see Culture and Society, pp. 130–48).
9	 See Anthony, John Ruskin’s Labour, p. 189. Gill G. Cockram offers the fullest ac-
count of Ruskin’s influence; Ruskin’s work has been important to (among others) Wil-
liam morris, George Bernard Shaw, the Christian Socialists, and the founders of the 
British Labour Party (see Cockram, Ruskin and Social Reform: Ethics and Economics in the 
Victorian Age [London and New york: Tauris, 2007]). Here it is worth noting in par-
ticular that Ruskin’s writings were carefully read by mahatma Gandhi, whose Swadeshi 
movement made consumption a mode of political expression and action (see michele 
micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action 
[New york: Palgrave macmillan, 2003], pp. 40–42).
10	 Participants in Britain’s consumer cooperative movement, which began as early 
the late eighteenth century and flourished intermittently during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, also saw—albeit with varied degrees of radicalism—consump-
tion as a potential mode of resistance to capitalism. See Peter Gurney, Co-operative Cul-
ture and the Politics of Consumption in England, 1870–1930 (manchester and New york: 
manchester Univ. Press, 1996); and Gurney, “Labor’s Great Arch: Cooperation and 
Cultural Revolution in Britain, 1795–1926,” in Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer 
Cooperation in Europe, North America, and Japan, 1840–1990, ed. Ellen Furlough and Carl 
Strikwerda (Lanham, md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 135–74; the editors’ 
introduction to this collection also offers useful historical background.
11	 See Gagnier, The Insatiability of Human Wants, p. 128. David m. Craig’s book-length 
study argues for Ruskin’s current relevance as a thinker in consumer ethics (see Craig, 
John Ruskin and the Ethics of Consumption [Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2006]).
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lives of those who produce the goods they buy, as well as the en-
vironmental effects of those purchases, makes him an eloquent 
forerunner of the “political consumerism” movement today.12 
Like Ruskin, today’s political consumers see the market as an 
arena in which one’s choices affect other humans and in which 
one is therefore, in effect, interacting with other humans, al-
beit at a distance.
Eliot too conceives of economic behavior as social behav-
ior. Reading Middlemarch alongside works by Ruskin that are 
central texts in the history of political consumerism shows that 
Eliot’s novel too has a place in that history. When we place Mid-
dlemarch in the context of writing about ethical consumption, 
we can trace the contours of an important subcategory within 
the larger rubric of the “novel of purpose” defined by Amanda 
Claybaugh: the novel of consumer ethics. Claybaugh discusses 
Middlemarch as one of many novels of purpose in which reform 
is treated but not necessarily endorsed; her insight is that au-
thors might write novels of purpose for reasons wholly apart 
from a wish to provoke reform, and that we misread when we 
take their works to be merely hypocritical. In the novel of con-
sumer ethics, such a reluctance to endorse reform is accom-
panied by a readiness to represent consumption as a form of 
social and political participation. In her reading of Middle-
march, Claybaugh argues that Eliot is an author who “chafed 
against” the role of the novelist of purpose and who “sought 
to rid the realist novel of its too-reformist purposes.”13 We can 
12	 micheletti contends that political consumerism is “individualized collective action,” 
political engagement suitable for a world in which multinational corporations may be 
more powerful than political institutions, and in which identity tends to be serial and 
individual rather than fixed and collective (see micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping, 
p. xi). See also Andreas Follesdal, “Political Consumerism as Chance and Challenge,” 
in Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present, ed. mi-
chele micheletti, Andreas Follesdal, and Dietlind Stolle (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transac-
tion, 2004), pp. 3–20. Critics of political consumerism often object to the movement’s 
implicit acceptance of the economic concept of “consumer sovereignty,” adopting the 
marxist argument that consumption can only serve to enmesh persons more securely 
within the system of consumer capitalism. For a thorough interrogation of the notion 
of “consumer sovereignty,” see Peter G. Penz, Consumer Sovereignty and Human Interests 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986).
13	 Amanda Claybaugh, The Novel of Purpose: Literature and Social Reform in the Anglo-
American World (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 50, 117. Claybaugh discusses 
NCL6502_04.indd   219 9/24/10   10:18:10 AM
220	 nineteenth-century literature
build upon this observation by noting that while Eliot’s novel 
avoids endorsing traditional forms of political reform, it also 
encourages us to understand consumption as an act with politi-
cal and social consequences. What appears to be simply a re-
jection of political change is also therefore a representation of 
a very modern mode of political engagement, one that would 
become increasingly relevant as the development of consumer 
society accelerated over the course of the following century. It 
is not new to read Eliot’s work alongside Ruskin’s, or to note 
agreement between them. But when we use Ruskin’s economic 
writings to expose Middlemarch as a novel of consumer ethics, 
we can name as one of the novel’s modernities its representa-
tion of personal economic consumption as an emergent mode 
of social and political agency.
Eliot’s and Ruskin’s shared sense that economic exchange 
is a social phenomenon anticipates Georg Simmel’s later ef-
fort to investigate “the sociological character of money” and his 
understanding of exchange as “one of those relations through 
which a number of individuals become a social group.” Taking 
exchange as the basic form of all human interaction, Simmel 
defines a society as the “synthesis” of many such interactions, a 
“living organism” that is “the sum of interacting forces among 
the atoms of the organism.”14 Writing decades before Simmel 
offers this description of money’s social functions and effects, 
Eliot and Ruskin use the same organic model in communicating 
to their readers the interconnectedness and interdependence 
of all persons in the whole that is society. To spend money mind-
fully on a purchase, they insist, is to experience one’s unavoid-
able participation in the economic systems of circulation that 
manifest this interconnectedness. Eliot and Ruskin struggle to 
Middlemarch and Henry James’s The Princess Casamassima (1886) in the same chapter, 
arguing that both Eliot and James “recognized in reformist fiction a starker version 
of the formal problem posed by all forms of realism—and at the center of their own 
careers. This is the problem of representativeness” (The Novel of Purpose, p. 117). It 
should be noted that The Princess Casamassima is also a novel of consumer ethics, and 
is concerned perhaps even more conspicuously than Middlemarch with the problem of 
how to spend wealth well.
14	 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 174–75.
NCL6502_04.indd   220 9/24/10   10:18:10 AM
george eliot and john ruskin 221
define a consumer ethics for a modern industrial world where 
interrelation appears to be infinite and where, for that reason, 
consumption must be considered in light of its effects on oth-
ers. Their work is worth examining as we attempt to define con-
sumer ethics for our own postmodern, post-industrial world. 
Zygmunt Bauman writes: “Within the world’s dense network of 
global interdependence, we cannot be sure of our moral inno-
cence whenever other human beings suffer indignity, misery, 
or pain. We cannot declare that we do not know, nor can we be 
certain that there is nothing we could change in our conduct 
that would avert or at least alleviate the sufferers’ fate”; Bau-
man’s assessment of the difficulties of acting ethically within 
“liquid modernity” echoes Eliot’s awareness that the effects of 
our smallest actions are “incalculably diffusive” (Middlemarch, 
p. 825).15 The call for moral vigilance that Eliot and Ruskin is-
sue speaks to our anxious era as well as their own.
In The Political Economy of Art (1857), Ruskin 
distinguishes between “selfish” and “unselfish” spending: an 
article “may be one useful to the whole community, or useful 
only to ourselves”; we spend “unselfishly,” he asserts, when our 
purchases direct the labor of producers “to the service of the 
community.”16 Ruskin orders consumers to view themselves as 
15	 Zygmunt Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? (Cambridge, 
mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008), p. 72. Bauman has written extensively on “liquid 
modernity” as a mode in which social and institutional systems are fluid and transient, 
and human experience is characterized by fragmentation and uncertainty.
16	 John Ruskin, “A Joy for Ever,” Being the Substance (with Additions) of Two Lec-
tures on The Political Economy of Art (1857, 1880), ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wed-
derburn, vol. 16 of The Works of John Ruskin (New york: Longmans, Green, 1903–1912), 
p. 49. Subsequent citations in the text refer to this edition as The Political Economy of Art. 
In this essay I treat Ruskin’s two major early pieces of economic writing. Ruskin wrote 
The Political Economy of Art, his first sustained foray into social and economic criticism, 
as a series of lectures; he delivered them in manchester in 1857 and published them in 
the same year. much of his later economic thinking appears in some form in this work; 
on the occasion of its (very successful) reissuing in 1880, Ruskin wrote in his preface, 
“what I have since written on the political influence of the Arts has been little more 
than the expansion of these first lectures” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 12). While it 
is probable that George Eliot read Unto This Last (1860), it is certain that she read this 
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duty-bearing members of a community rather than individu-
als seeking gratification: they should place the needs of others 
before their own desires, and spend accordingly. This empha-
sis on taking care of others before oneself—and the particular 
obligation of the rich to do so—finds an echo in the attitude 
toward wealth of Eliot’s heroine: one of Dorothea’s most fre-
quently articulated problems is her unease with her money and 
her worry about how to spend it.17 Dorothea is the principal 
voice for Ruskinian economic thinking in Middlemarch, and 
her views are Ruskinian not just in substance but also in style: 
she is passionate, indignant, and given to overstatement and 
occasional contradiction. At the beginning of the novel she is 
deeply engaged in her “Puritan” religion and has a rather indis-
criminate enthusiasm for renunciation; as her less pious sister 
says: “She likes giving up” (Middlemarch, p. 18). She answers the 
problem of how to spend her wealth by recourse to an anxious 
and almost compulsive habit of real or intended philanthropy.
When faced with the question of how to consume ethically, 
Ruskin, Eliot, and Dorothea—each a sometime Evangelical—
are consistently attracted to the simple answer of ascesis.18 Their 
anxiety about consumption is not unusual in nineteenth- 
century Britain. Discussing “the dilemmas of affluent Puritan-
ism,” Deborah Cohen describes a movement over the course of 
the century away from widespread renunciatory religiosity toward 
a “post-evangelical mindset” in which purchases and possessions 
earlier work, as she expressed qualified admiration for it in an 1858 letter (see George 
Eliot, letter to Sara Sophia Hennell, 17 January 1858, in The George Eliot Letters, ed. Gor-
don S. Haight, 9 vols. [New Haven: yale Univ. Press, 1954–1978], II, 422).
17	 money in Eliot’s fiction has been a fruitful focus for critical inquiry. Eliot’s rela-
tion to economic thought has recently been explored in two works of criticism that 
read her novels alongside economic texts. See Catherine Gallagher, The Body Economic: 
Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 2006); and Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy. Gillian Beer’s earlier article 
explores the functions of money in Middlemarch (see Beer, “Circulatory Systems: money 
and Gossip in Middlemarch,” Cahiers Victoriens et Edouardiens, no. 26 [1987], 47–62).
18	 Elisabeth Jay notes that George Eliot and Ruskin share a “desire to defend real-
ism on moral rather than aesthetic grounds,” and she identifies this desire as typical 
among lapsed Evangelicals in the Victorian era. Jay suggests that the novelist’s affinity 
for the critic “stems . . . from the one common inheritance they shared, Evangelical-
ism” (Elisabeth Jay, The Religion of the Heart: Anglican Evangelicalism and the Nineteenth-
Century Novel [oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], pp. 217, 210).
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themselves served moral functions.19 Both the plot and the 
composition of Middlemarch take place as this shift is happen-
ing. “At the dawn of the age of mass consumerism,” Cohen ex-
plains, “worldly pleasures had first to be cleared of the charge 
of self-indulgence” (Household Gods, p. 30). Eliot and Ruskin 
address the question of whether that charge should in fact be 
cleared, and they ask us to consider the losses attendant upon 
both self-indulgence and self-denial. Both authors recognize 
that the question of consumption must be more complicated 
than the young Dorothea acknowledges. To say that renuncia-
tion is always right is to give a too-easy answer; as Ruskin asserts 
in The Political Economy of Art, perfection lies in a “balanced divi-
sion” of care that sees to both “utility and splendour” (p. 20).
When the category of art serves to legitimize select modes 
and habits of consumption, the education that provides access 
to art becomes the criterion for consuming without the stain of 
luxuriousness. Education, and women’s exclusion from it, is of 
course one of the great obsessions of Middlemarch. The vari-
ously undereducated women of the novel suffer from, among 
other things, disorders of consumption: Dorothea’s anxious 
renunciations and impulsive philanthropy are only somewhat 
healthier than Rosamond’s excessive zeal for buying expensive 
goods on credit. Aesthetics and political economy—discourses 
of a common origin—are linked in Middlemarch not just implic-
itly, because the novel represents the role of art in marking out 
social and economic boundaries, but also explicitly, because 
these are both subjects from which the novel’s female charac-
ters are shut out by their laughable half-educations.
Critics have studied both Dorothea’s aesthetic education 
in appreciating art and her political-economic education in 
spending.20 The ongoing critical discussion about consumption 
19	 See Cohen, Household Gods: The British and Their Possessions (New Haven: yale 
Univ. Press, 2006), pp. xvi, 19. Cohen points to “mrs. Bulstrode’s naïve way of conciliat-
ing piety and worldliness, the nothingness of this life and the desirability of cut glass, 
the consciousness at once of filthy rags and the best damask” (Middlemarch, p. 263) as 
an archly offered expression of the era’s pressing question: “How to be good and well-
to-do” (Household Gods, p. 30).
20	 Joseph Wiesenfarth argues that Dorothea’s education over the course of the novel 
is an aesthetic one: he shows that she learns a Ruskinian “language of art” in order to 
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in the novel, however, does not sufficiently interpenetrate with 
the discussion about art and aesthetics. Critical studies of con-
sumption and commodity culture in Middlemarch err when they 
examine spending on domestic objects and on female dress 
and ornament and devote less attention to the novel’s treat-
ment of objects categorized as art.21 The novel itself resists this 
division of subject matter: George Eliot generally represents art 
and other aesthetically interesting items in the novel as things 
that money can buy. And because the aesthetic has been since 
the eighteenth century (at least) a crucial category within the 
cultural conversation about consumption, Dorothea’s aesthetic 
education and her political-economic education in consuming 
should not be studied as discrete phenomena; the two educa-
tions need to be examined as one.
Dorothea suffers from her lack of education in aesthetics 
and political economy perhaps most obviously when her uncle 
mr. Brooke uses her ignorance in those fields to dismiss her 
opinions. Having apparently dabbled during his youth at the 
eighteenth-century moral philosophy in which these divergent 
discourses originate, he uses his gentleman’s education to de-
flect his niece from the topics of beauty, money, and societal 
resolve the conflict between her ascetic Puritan morality and her desire to enjoy beauty 
(see Wiesenfarth, “Middlemarch: The Language of Art,” PMLA, 97 [1982], 363–77). more 
recently, Elaine Freedgood has characterized Dorothea’s education as “the bildung . . . 
of the modern consumer” (Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Vic-
torian Novel [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006], p. 119). Krista Lysack also exam-
ines Dorothea as a consumer. In her book about Victorian women and shopping, she 
contends (as I do) that consumption can present an occasion for agency; she finds that 
Dorothea’s “management style is extravagantly, even perversely restrained,” and is “the 
opposite of the middle-class mode of management constructed in Victorian domestic 
advice literature.” Her argument emphasizes the heroine’s tendency toward “risky in-
vestment” and her “willing[ness] to borrow against the future,” as she tries to make “an 
‘epic life’” (Krista Lysack, Come Buy, Come Buy: Shopping and the Culture of Consumption in 
Victorian Women’s Writing [Athens: ohio Univ. Press, 2008], p. 83.)
21	 Art objects figure importantly, however, in Freedgood’s The Ideas in Things, as 
well as in Andrew H. miller’s illuminating chapter on commodity culture in Middle-
march (see miller, Novels behind Glass: Commodity Culture and Victorian Narrative [Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995], pp. 189–218). See also Hugh Witemeyer, George 
Eliot and the Visual Arts (New Haven: yale Univ. Press, 1979); and Ruth Bernard yeazell, 
Art of the Everyday: Dutch Painting and the Realist Novel (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
2008). Witemeyer and yeazell discuss Eliot’s thinking about art and Ruskin’s signifi-
cant influence on it.
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organization by noting that she can never be a qualified judge 
(like himself) on such subjects. Early in the novel, we read of 
Dorothea’s “annoyance at being twitted with her ignorance 
of political economy, that never-explained science which was 
thrust as an extinguisher over all her lights” (Middlemarch, p. 
18). The offending twit issues from Brooke, who says: “young 
ladies don’t understand political economy, you know. . . . I re-
member when we were all reading Adam Smith. There is a book, 
now. I took in all the new ideas at one time—human perfectibil-
ity, now” (p. 17). Possessed of a classical education and a mighty 
penchant for allusion, Brooke affectionately revisits ill-grasped 
ideas, deploying approximations of them good-heartedly for 
their cultural capital. His regular interjections of “you know” 
are friendly, but they also impose a certain acquiescence upon 
his auditors. Thus does the avuncular, oblivious man maintain 
his particular dominance. It is a dominance based on class, but 
also—and usually explicitly—on gender. Brooke’s disjointed 
commentary furnishes some of the novel’s funniest moments, 
but its effects on Dorothea are unfortunately cruel.
Political economy and art are linked in the novel because 
they are both areas from which Dorothea is shut out by her in-
adequate education, and they are both subjects that her uncle 
uses to remind her in his allusive and approximating fashion 
of her intellectual irrelevance. When Dorothea explains to her 
uncle with her usual fiery loquacity why it has been difficult for 
her to like art, his “masculine consciousness” falls into “rather 
a stammering condition under the eloquence of his niece”; he 
eventually, with difficulty, says to her and Will Ladislaw:
“There is something in what you say, my dear, something in 
what you say—but not everything—eh, Ladislaw? you and I don’t 
like our pictures and statues being found fault with. young ladies 
are a little ardent, you know—a little one-sided, my dear. Fine 
art, poetry, that kind of thing, elevates a nation—emollit mores—
you understand a little Latin now.” (Middlemarch, p. 380)
With the interjection of disembodied Latin, the explicit state-
ment about the mental incapacity of women, the lazy half-com-
plete references, and the clubby, even slightly bullying, appeal 
for solidarity with the fellow male present, Brooke is in fine 
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characteristic form. When the masculine consciousness finds it-
self threatened, art, like political economy, serves to extinguish 
young female lights. Here Eliot quite overtly represents the use 
of the aesthetic by the more powerful to exert dominance over 
the less powerful.22
We find another instance of young female lights snuffed 
out by reference to art in the scene in which Dorothea first 
meets Ladislaw. When asked to comment on his sketch, Doro-
thea offers a long, self-deprecating comment in which she states 
of pictures, “They are a language I do not understand” (Middle-
march, p. 78). Joseph Wiesenfarth uses this remark to ground 
an argument about Dorothea’s education in Ruskinian aesthet-
ics. Drawing links to Ladislaw’s later remark about art as an “old 
language” and Eliot’s review of Ruskin’s lectures, Wiesenfarth 
reads the “language” that Dorothea mentions (Middlemarch, p. 
200) as the Ruskinian “language of art” (Wiesenfarth, “Middle-
march: The Language of Art,” p. 366). “Language” is indeed 
an important word to trace as one studies Dorothea’s progress 
into greater knowledge in Middlemarch. But the language she 
lacks is not simply the language of art. She says of pictures, 
“They are a language I do not understand,” but she uses the 
same word when expressing uncertainty about the right means 
of “doing good”: “everything seems like going on a mission to a 
people whose language I don’t know” (Middlemarch, p. 28). For 
Dorothea the language requisite for “doing good” is the lan-
guage that enables one to talk about how money, persons, and 
property move in the world. As Dorice Williams Elliott states 
22	 Here the use of art and aesthetics for ultimately social purposes is a specifically 
male practice, but the novel does not imply that this is always the case. Rosamond 
makes the appreciation of art a fatally effective tactic for presenting herself as a perfect 
young lady and thus snaring Lydgate. See in particular the episode of The Keepsake: 
George Eliot stages a confrontation between two rival suitors in which both they and 
the coveted girl attempt to get what they want by drawing from varied stores of cul-
tural capital (see Middlemarch, pp. 263–66). marjorie Garson discusses this scene in her 
investigation of “the ideological work done by the equation of good taste and moral 
refinement” in Middlemarch (Garson, Moral Taste: Aesthetics, Subjectivity, and Social Power 
in the Nineteenth-Century Novel [Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2007], p. 4). Garson 
observes accurately that the novel is aware of the systems that Bourdieu observes, but is 
unable to escape them: Eliot fails to achieve “sociological objectivity,” Garson argues, 
because of “the mystified representation of Dorothea’s taste and beauty” (Moral Taste, 
p. 38; see also pp. 330–67).
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succinctly in her reading of this passage, “the ‘language’ Doro-
thea does not know is political economy.”23 Brooke’s uniform 
“twitting” about art and political economy helps to establish the 
continuity of her ignorance.
This ignorance makes Dorothea’s wealth a painful respon-
sibility rather than an opportunity for profit or pleasure: her 
money buys her, as we have seen, “nothing but an uneasy con-
science” (Middlemarch, p. 364). This uneasiness recalls Ruskin’s 
remark in The Political Economy of Art that “wealth is simply one 
of the greatest powers which can be entrusted to human hands: 
a power, not indeed to be envied, because it seldom makes us 
happy; but still less to be abdicated or despised” (The Political 
Economy of Art, p. 17). He adds that “inherited wealth” involves 
“the most definite responsibilities” (p. 128).
Middlemarch makes true what in other stories might be 
merely felt: within the novel, money earned through work—
even through trade or manufacturing—seems free from stain, 
while wealth gained by birth or marriage repeatedly bears a 
moral taint. Casaubon’s inherited fortune (and Dorothea’s for-
tune by marriage) should rightfully have gone to his aunt Julia, 
and thence to Will Ladislaw’s father. Ladislaw’s mother’s fam-
ily’s money, held by Bulstrode, is gained through crime, and 
thus too dirty an inheritance for Ladislaw’s conscience. Middle-
march’s plotting literalizes fears born of anxiety about wealth 
generally, and unearned wealth in particular. Dorothea’s for-
tune by marriage does not merely feel unfairly held: it is the 
rightful property of an impoverished person. George Eliot’s 
plot thus gives Dorothea’s generalized, amorphous feelings of 
guilt about money—which precede her marriage—a legitimate 
and specific object in the real world. Dorothea urges Casau-
bon to give money to Will, contending: “if one has too much 
in consequence of others being wronged, it seems to me that 
the divine voice which tells us to set that wrong right must be 
obeyed” (Middlemarch, p. 365). But there is slippage between 
the “too much” that she has because of her marriage and the 
“too much” to which she was born. Immediately prior to stating 
23	 Elliott, The Angel out of the House: Philanthropy and Gender in Nineteenth-Century Eng-
land (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 2002), p. 206.
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Will’s claim, she says to her husband: “I have been thinking 
about money all day—that I have always had too much, and es-
pecially the prospect of too much” (p. 365). Earlier she says to 
Will, “I have always had too much of everything” (p. 357). The 
occasion for “giving up” is new, but the uncomfortable sense of 
unjust superabundance has “always” been there. The same plot 
that creates a real object for Dorothea’s longstanding anxieties 
also makes the romantic hero the rightful heir to not one but 
two stolen fortunes, denied to him on both his maternal and 
his paternal sides by the rebellious and righteous behavior of 
his renouncing antecedents. His pennilessness is so overdeter-
mined as to accomplish the effects of caricature: the sheer vol-
ume of foregone wealth he does not have is enough to make the 
not-having of money one of his salient features.
Like Ruskin, Dorothea sees consumption as an activity 
through which one may inadvertently injure other human be-
ings. Near the novel’s conclusion, she sits down to read “her 
particular little heap of books on political economy and kindred 
matters, out of which she was trying to get light as to the best way 
of spending money so as not to injure one’s neighbours, or—
what comes to the same thing—so as to do them the most good” 
(Middlemarch, p. 794). Dorothea’s aim in political economy is 
Ruskinian: not to gratify herself, or to build wealth generally, 
but to do good. Her wish to spend so as not to injure others is 
notably defensive rather than constructive. We see this defensive 
stance in an even more extreme form when she says to Will, “I 
try not to have desires merely for myself, because they may not 
be good for others, and I have too much already” (pp. 382–83). 
In Dorothea’s imagination, even desires not yet acted upon may 
bear potentially harmful effects on people around her.24
This cautious hyperconsciousness helps Dorothea to live 
by George Eliot’s moral principles. Both for Eliot and for Dor-
othea, moral living requires that one maintain vigilant aware-
ness, because there are always unintended consequences to 
one’s actions: when one’s effects in the world are “incalculably 
24	 This sense that one’s internal desires may have harmful effects in the external 
world correlates with George Eliot’s interest in convenient manslaughter and acciden-
tal or ambiguous criminality—as, for example, in the deaths of Raffles in Middlemarch 
and Grandcourt in Daniel Deronda (1876).
NCL6502_04.indd   228 9/24/10   10:18:12 AM
george eliot and john ruskin 229
diffusive,” some of those effects will be troubling (Middlemarch, 
p. 825). The circulation of money and goods in a society (be 
it global or local) offers a material manifestation of this truth: 
the image of the web that George Eliot famously uses to fig-
ure human society finds its real-world corollary in an economy. 
Ruskin’s The Political Economy of Art clarifies that consumption is 
a moral minefield in this respect: the chains of supply and de-
mand set us at a distance from other humans, and, if we are to 
live rightly, we must struggle continually to discern the effects 
of our choices upon those individuals.
Ruskin collapses the distance between the shopper and the 
worker by personalizing relations rhetorically, describing the 
relation between consumer and producer as one between mas-
ter and servant.25 Dorothea already has personal relations with 
those to whom she is mistress, and her mastery over them is 
real rather than metaphoric. Ruskin writes that “the rich man” 
should administer his larger share of capital “for the profit of 
all, directing each man to the labour which is most healthy for 
him, and most serviceable for the community” (The Political 
Economy of Art, p. 129). Ruskin’s rich man exercises a sort of po-
litical leadership through his consumption, and personal grati-
fication does not seem to interest him. The political character 
of his power, and the fact that his money puts him in the role of 
“master” to those beneath him, make Ruskin’s good rich man 
resemble a feudal lord.
Dorothea, as the heir by blood to her uncle’s estate, con-
forms partly to this archaic ideal. She is of course a rich woman 
instead of a rich man: Elliott notes that her various charitable 
activities “are characteristic of the traditional Lady Bountiful” 
(The Angel out of the House, p. 205). Jessica Gerard argues that 
nineteenth-century British women of the gentry and aristoc-
racy served an important political function as they performed 
these activities: they “reinforced the landed classes’ rule over 
the rural poor, implementing paternalism and enforcing 
25	 Ruskin admonishes his auditors to imagine the workers who produce the goods 
they buy, and to sympathize with these workers as individual humans; the effort he 
insists upon is exactly analogous to the efforts of today’s “political consumers” “to trace 
the commodity chain of the products offered to us on the global consumer market,” as 
micheletti puts it (Political Virtue and Shopping, p. 74).
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deference.”26 This link between philanthropy and the pres-
ervation of the status quo emerges clearly in Ruskin’s Unto 
This Last (1860). mounting an argument against socialism, he 
writes that the “division of property is its destruction,” and ex-
plains: “The rich man does not keep back meat from the poor 
by retaining his riches; but by basely using them. Riches are a 
form of strength; and a strong man does not injure others by 
keeping his strength, but by using it injuriously.”27 Ruskin ar-
gues in The Political Economy of Art that “a rich man ought to be 
continually examining how he may spend his money for the 
advantage of others” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 128).
Dorothea’s efforts at the sort of philanthropy that Ruskin 
advises are continually frustrated, however. Even as she comes 
of age, and even as she devotes diligent attention to her little 
heap of books on political economy, her philanthropic dreams 
are difficult to realize.28 Her partial understanding and failed 
attempts to participate in political economy can be traced at 
least in part to her weak education. We should recognize that 
Dorothea’s earnest work with her books is the effort of a te-
nacious autodidact, and that when she tries “to get light as 
to the best way of spending money,” she is attempting to re-
kindle the “lights” extinguished so painfully by her uncle hun-
dreds of pages before (Middlemarch, pp. 794, 18). Just as Rosa-
mond’s habits of consumption are shaped by her education at 
mrs. Lemon’s, so are Dorothea’s shaped by her education at 
26	 Gerard, “Lady Bountiful: Women of the Landed Classes and Rural Philanthropy,” 
Victorian Studies, 30 (1987), 183.
27	 John Ruskin, Unto This Last, ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, vol. 17 
of The Works of John Ruskin (New york: Longmans, Green, 1903–1912), pp. 106–7n. 
Subsequent citations in the text refer to this edition.
28	 Dorothea complains: “they tell me I have too little [money] for any great scheme 
of the sort I like best, and yet I have too much. I don’t know what to do” (Middlemarch, 
p. 754). Dorothea’s remark about what “they” tell her suggests that one reason for 
her philanthropic frustrations is that, as a woman, she does not have sufficient con-
trol over her wealth. For the limitations faced by women philanthropists, see Gerard, 
“Lady Bountiful,” p. 191; and Elliott, The Angel out of the House, p. 195. In her reading 
of Middlemarch as a chronicle of “the failure of the ideal represented by the philan-
thropic heroine” (The Angel out of the House, p. 190), Elliott notes that Dorothea’s “great 
scheme” of founding a village recalls owenite projects, and that nineteenth-century 
readers would have been aware that most such efforts ended in failure (see The Angel 
out of the House, pp. 194, 189).
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Lausanne under mademoiselle Poinçon. That education has, 
all too inadequately, made “Puritan” religion the best guide for 
Dorothea to interpret the world as she meets it. At the begin-
ning of the book, both her aesthetics and her political economy 
are Puritan in character.
on the topic of improving cottages, Dorothea contends 
against her uncle: “It is not a sin to make yourself poor in per-
forming experiments for the good of all” (Middlemarch, p. 16). 
She uses moral and religious diction here to defend her idea 
about spending money.29 In a later discussion about cottage 
improvement initiatives, Sir James makes the financial remark, 
“of course, it is sinking money; that is why people object to 
it” (Middlemarch, p. 30). once again, Dorothea responds to a 
money problem in religious terms, pronouncing: “I think we 
deserve to be beaten out of our beautiful houses with a scourge 
of small cords—all of us who let tenants live in such sties as we 
see round us” (p. 31). The young Dorothea’s political econ-
omy, like her general approach to life, it is characterized by an 
immediate recourse to renunciation; this blind grasping is part 
of her desperate allegiance to the sole source of seriousness to 
which her intelligence has been allowed access.
The narrator is explicit with regard to Dorothea’s simi-
larly untutored Puritan perception of art: “To poor Dorothea 
these severe classical nudities and smirking Renaissance-Cor-
reggiosities were painfully inexplicable, staring into the midst 
of her Puritanic conceptions: she had never been taught how 
she could bring them into any sort of relevance with her life” 
(Middlemarch, p. 72). Dorothea herself is sufficiently self-aware 
to explain some of this thinking to Brooke:
“That is one reason why I did not like the pictures here, dear 
uncle—which you think me stupid about. I used to come from 
the village with all that dirt and coarse ugliness like a pain within 
29	 This move is Ruskinian: Claudia C. Klaver notes that Ruskin’s formal strategy 
involves reinserting the moral and the religious into the economic (see Klaver, A/Moral 
Economics: Classical Political Economy and Cultural Authority in Nineteenth-Century England 
[Columbus: ohio State Univ. Press, 2003], pp. 161–72). Supritha Rajan discusses 
Ruskin’s “synthesis of economic and religious categories such as exchange and ritual,” 
with reference to Baudrillard’s work on sacrifice (Rajan, “Sacred Commerce: Rites of 
Reciprocity in Ruskin,” Nineteenth-Century Prose, 35, no. 1 [2008], 183).
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me, and the simpering pictures in the drawing-room seemed to 
me like a wicked attempt to find delight in what is false, while we 
don’t mind how hard the truth is for the neighbours outside our 
walls.” (pp. 379–80)
Just as in political economy she clung to the Puritan strategy of 
renunciation, in art Dorothea clings to the Puritan idea that art 
is deception, separate from and irrelevant to life.
Less explicit than Dorothea’s dual ignorance in aesthet-
ics and political economy, and her reliance on an inadequate 
Puritan worldview to understand them, is the inseparability of 
the two subjects for her within that worldview. She does not 
particularly like art, because she views it not in aesthetic terms 
as an object that might provide pleasure, but in political- 
economic terms as a commodity upon which wealth and men-
tal energy may be spent. As such, it is a costly thing that takes 
these resources away from other objects of expenditure, like 
the amelioration of living conditions for the poor. It looms 
before her as “all this immense expense of art, that seems some-
how to lie outside life and make it no better for the world”; she 
cannot enjoy this expensive thing, she says: “It spoils my enjoy-
ment of anything when I am made to think that most people 
are shut out from it” (Middlemarch, p. 214). And just as she 
views art in political-economic terms, she tends to cast her per-
ceptions of political-economic phenomena in aesthetic terms. 
The troubling sights in the village constitute for her a “coarse 
ugliness”; she wishes to attempt, by building cottages, “to make 
the life of poverty beautiful!” (p. 31); and she tells Ladislaw as 
she describes her concerns about the great unjustified cost of 
art, “I should like to make life beautiful—I mean everybody’s 
life” (p. 214).
The unity of political-economic and aes-
thetic concerns in Dorothea’s mind corresponds with Ruskin’s 
views on art and society. Ruskin, like Dorothea, found himself 
accused of being too passionate and too ill-informed when he 
expressed these views. His emphatically oppositional stance 
NCL6502_04.indd   232 9/24/10   10:18:13 AM
george eliot and john ruskin 233
toward the political-economic establishment of his day involved 
a subversive embrace of this apparent naïveté and a remarkable 
refusal to accept the basic principles of the science.30 In Unto 
This Last Ruskin specifically targets John Stuart mill’s funda-
mental assertion that value, in political-economic terms, is al-
ways value in exchange; for Ruskin this is an unacceptable way 
of understanding the world, even temporarily for the purpose 
of intellectual inquiry.31
Ruskin subscribes instead to a labor theory of value that 
assesses the value of an object primarily in terms of the quantity 
and quality of human labor that went into its production. This 
theory makes value intrinsic—and also implies that calcula-
tions of value must take into account moral questions about the 
conditions of production. This understanding of value shapes 
Ruskin’s consumer ethics. His belief that each article must 
be evaluated for its integral worth correlates with a sense that 
money dies at the point of purchase, and with a zero-sum con-
ception of wealth as limited. The political economists, in con-
trast, see wealth as expandable and money as a continuously 
circulating force for growth, a symbolic substance reabsorbed 
back into the economy in order to fuel new activity and build 
new value. Ruskin’s objection to fluid and extrinsic value makes 
him particularly averse to credit; in Unto This Last he places in 
the same category as old-fashioned poisoning and blackmail 
“the more modern and less honourable system of obtaining 
goods on credit, and the other variously improved methods of 
appropriation” (Unto This Last, pp. 61–62). Credit is of course 
essential to the rapidly expanding consumer economy of his 
30	 one example is Ruskin’s notorious claim in the 1857 preface to The Political Econ-
omy of Art: “I have never read any author on political economy, except Adam Smith, 
twenty years ago” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 10).
31	 Though the instability of value was not a new idea in nineteenth-century Britain, 
the first half of the century saw important changes in the way in which economic in-
stitutions worked, and those changes had to do with embracing an understanding of 
value as unfixed and, more important, expandable. See Patrick Brantlinger, Fictions of 
State: Culture and Credit in Britain, 1694–1994 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 
140–41. Especially during financial crises, the question of how to conceive of value was 
an urgent, practical, and public issue. Poovey investigates the ways that various genres 
“mediated the credit economy” and “helped make the system of credit and debt usable 
and the market model of value familiar as well” (Genres of the Credit Economy, p. 2).
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era; in Middlemarch the representatives of this economy are Ro-
samond and Lydgate, spenders on credit and buyers of many, 
many things.
Ruskin understands that the modern consumer economy 
to which he is opposed depends upon continual purchasing: in 
The Political Economy of Art he mounts his opposition to this sort 
of economy partly by valorizing goods that are “permanent” 
rather than “perishable.” He urges consumers to understand 
that goods fall into one of two categories: an “article may be 
a useful and lasting one, or it may be a useless and perishable 
one” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 49).32 It is the conscientious 
consumer’s duty to choose to buy goods in the former category 
rather than those in the latter. Ruskin imagines “some political 
economist” interrupting his lecture to say, “Better allow for a 
little wholesome evanescence—beneficent destruction: let each 
age provide art for itself, or we shall soon have so many good 
pictures that we shall not know what to do with them” (The Po-
litical Economy of Art, p. 40). The political economist argues that 
producing and buying permanent art will result in oversupply 
and a consequent drop in demand that “will throw your artists 
quite out of work” (p. 40). The economic model advocated by 
the political economist imagines goods continually being pro-
duced, bought, used, exhausted, and replaced. To this dynamic 
model Ruskin opposes one that is luminously static.
32	 Ruskin’s attack on perishable goods neatly pinpoints the insatiable desire for 
novelty that is the signature feature of consumer society. Perishability defines fashion, 
and the subject of fashion is a crucial entry point for Georg Simmel’s and Walter Ben-
jamin’s analyses of consumer society; see especially Simmel, The Philosophy of Fashion 
(1905), trans. mark Ritter and David Frisby, in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, ed. 
David Frisby and mike Featherstone (Thousand oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997), pp. 187–205; 
and Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin mcLaughlin (Cam-
bridge, mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 62–81. The representa-
tion of female dress in Middlemarch has received much critical attention: miller argues 
that “women’s dress is the paradigmatic instance of material culture in Middlemarch” 
(Novels behind Glass, pp. 12–13; see also pp. 192–97). Lysack’s Come Buy, Come Buy and 
Freedgood’s The Ideas in Things also discuss the functions of dress and fashion in the 
novel. Kate Flint’s examination of materiality and its perception in Middlemarch situates 
a discussion of female dress in the larger context of the textile manufacturing industry 
also (albeit less conspicuously) represented in the novel (see Flint, “The materiality of 
Middlemarch,” in “Middlemarch” in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Karen Chase [New york: 
oxford Univ. Press, 2006], pp. 67–70).
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Ruskin associates consumption and evanescence not with 
the fecundity of economic regeneration but with death.33 His 
alternative economic model puts a stop to the ceaseless de-
structive flow of commerce. A quiet continuum between past 
and present characterizes his scheme, which is also suffused 
with the vitalism that will become more explicit in Unto This 
Last. In that work Ruskin states the principle that wealth is life; 
here, in The Political Economy of Art, he expresses the idea that 
an ideal economy is one saturated with a certain still deathless-
ness, an atemporal constancy of life that values conservation 
over growth. “Wherever you go, whatever you do,” he advises, 
“act more for preservation and less for production” (The Political 
Economy of Art, p. 80). Following this advice is part of “fulfill-
ing” our “duties to the Past and the Future,” which are “recip-
rocal duties . . . constantly to be exchanged between the living 
and the dead”; the living have an obligation to do things that 
will be “serviceable” to “those who are to come after us,” just 
as those persons will have an obligation “to accept this work of 
ours with thanks and remembrance, not thrusting it aside or 
tearing it down the moment they think they have no use for it” 
(The Political Economy of Art, p. 63). Ruskin’s atemporal society 
makes generations relate to each other as contemporaries. Hu-
man creativity, he argues, should proceed not in cycles of pro-
duction and destruction, but in a single linear movement: “the 
science of nations is to be accumulative from father to son” 
(pp. 63–64). Poetry, history, science, and art should develop 
thus, “the work of living men is not superseding, but building 
itself upon the work of the past” (p. 64). This structure of re-
ciprocal obligation involves hope for the future and diligence 
in caring for the work of the past: all “Good Government,” he 
writes, “is expectant as well as conservative . . . if it ceases to be 
hopeful of better things, it ceases to be a wise guardian of pres-
ent things” (p. 54).
33	 In Unto This Last, Ruskin will express a positive conception of “consumption ab-
solute” according to which, “as consumption is the end and aim of production, so life 
is the end and aim of consumption” (Unto This Last, pp. 98, 104). This correlates, of 
course, with his view, declared in that work, that “THERE IS No WEALTH BUT LIFE” 
(Unto This Last, p. 105). The Political Economy of Art, however, offers negative images of 
consumption as wasteful and destructive.
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Art has a crucial role to play in the economy of Ruskin’s 
society. It is the signature imperishable good, the commodity 
that self-regenerates instead of being exhausted by use. In this 
quality it anticipates Ruskin’s definition in Unto This Last of 
“moral power” that is an “invisible gold,” which “does not nec-
essarily diminish in spending” (Unto This Last, pp. 54–55). He 
considers works of art “treasures” because they are a “perma-
nent means of pleasure and instruction” (The Political Economy 
of Art, p. 117n). He goes further still, and suggests that their 
permanence is such that it somehow bleeds into the world 
around them, describing “a certain protective effect on wealth 
exercised by works of high art”:
Generally speaking, persons who decorate their houses with pic-
tures will not spend so much money in papers, carpets, curtains, or 
other expensive and perishable luxuries as they would otherwise. 
Works of good art, like books, exercise a conservative effect on 
the rooms they are kept in; and the wall of the library or picture 
gallery remains undisturbed, when those of other rooms are re-pa-
pered or re-panelled. . . . And, generally speaking, the occupation 
of a large number of hands in painting or sculpture in any nation 
may be considered as tending to check the disposition to indulge 
in perishable luxury. (The Political Economy of Art, p. 117n)
Art has a “protective” or “conservative” effect partly because it 
consolidates wealth in the purchasing and preservation of its 
permanence, rather than in “perishable luxury.” But where 
does art stop and luxury begin? Ruskin suggests an explana-
tion when he asserts, “things that give intellectual or emotional 
enjoyment may be accumulated, and do not perish in using; 
but continually supply new pleasures and new powers of giving 
pleasures to others” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 133). The 
intellectual or emotional enjoyment available indefinitely in a 
work of art, then, is the feature that distinguishes it from luxury 
and puts it outside time.
But Ruskin acknowledges that “it is, of course, impossible to 
fix an accurate limit” between these two categories, or between 
that kind of property that is mere luxury and that kind of prop-
erty that “bestows intellectual or emotional pleasure, consisting of 
land set apart for purposes of delight more than for agriculture, 
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of books, works of art, and objects of natural history” (The Politi-
cal Economy of Art, p. 133). In fact, any given object in this latter 
category may slip into the former category, depending on the 
function it serves: “the most noble works of art are continually 
made material of vulgar luxury or of criminal pride.” To qualify 
as art rather than luxury, the object must be “rightly used”: “in-
tellectual or emotional pleasure” must be felt (p. 133).
The defining feature of art, then, is the manner in which 
it is “used.” An art object may be prized for its monetary or 
exchange value (“vulgar luxury”), but an art object is unique 
among buyable commodities in that, if “rightly used,” it may be 
used again and again, indefinitely: it is an inexhaustible, even 
self-regenerating, commodity. Ruskin constructs “art” as that 
which lasts, that which is imperishable, and the rest of com-
modity matter, including luxuries, as that which perishes in the 
using. This right sort of use may not be easily achieved, how-
ever, for as Ruskin has told us earlier, a “good picture, or book, 
or work of art of any kind, is always in some degree fenced and 
closed about with difficulty” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 58). 
His diction makes art a high-walled park with a closed gate, and 
thus emphasizes the exclusionary force of the system he has just 
constructed. In Distinction Bourdieu writes: “of all the objects 
offered for consumers’ choice, there are none more classifying 
than legitimate works of art, which, while distinctive in general, 
enable the production of distinctions ad infinitum” (Distinction, 
p. 16). If the capacity to provide “intellectual or emotional en-
joyment” is the feature that makes an art object “imperishable” 
and distinguishes it from a commodity, then those without the 
cultural capital that facilitates such enjoyment will have a hard 
time using art “rightly,” and will be stuck with mere luxury.
one person who has difficulty using art “rightly” is Doro-
thea. Having had “a bad style of teaching,” she lacks the educa-
tion that grants access to legitimate aesthetic enjoyment (Mid-
dlemarch, p. 78). When speaking to Will in Rome, Dorothea 
makes her great summary statement about her attitude toward 
art, calling it an “immense expense” and expressing her under-
standing of it in political-economic rather than aesthetic terms: 
she sees the art object as a made object like any other, an object 
that, when bought and maintained, subtracts resources from 
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more worthy efforts to better the world by helping people. Her 
arithmetic of scarcity recalls Ruskin’s zero-sum economics in 
The Political Economy of Art, as well as his assertion in Unto This 
Last that “for every plus there is a precisely equal minus” (Unto 
This Last, p. 91).34 And yet, as Wiesenfarth points out in “Mid-
dlemarch: The Language of Art,” Dorothea has yet to grasp a 
Ruskinian “language of art”: she does not have access to aes-
thetics as a conceptual tool for regulating consumption.
Will’s response to Dorothea’s statement makes their ex-
change a climactic moment in the novel’s treatment of the prob-
lem of consumption. He says to her: “I call that the fanaticism 
of sympathy. . . . you might say the same of landscape, of poetry, 
of all refinement” (Middlemarch, p. 214). Will, a well-educated 
young gentleman, appeals to vocabulary from the discourse of 
aesthetics (“refinement”) in order to make his statement about 
legitimate pleasure. A sometime artist himself, he insists that 
we cannot continuously assess all of the objects we encounter 
for their political-economic value. In contrast to the Ruskinian 
economy of scarcity that Dorothea envisions, in which her ev-
ery act of consumption must subtract from the consumption of 
others, Will opposes an economy of abundance in which enjoy-
ment is not limited. He tells Dorothea:
“The best piety is to enjoy—when you can. you are doing the 
most then to save the earth’s character as an agreeable planet. 
And enjoyment radiates. It is of no use to try and take care of all 
the world; that is being taken care of when you feel delight—in 
art or in anything else.” (pp. 214–15)
In defending “refinement” against politico-economic evalua-
tion, Will makes the rather shocking assertion that one indi-
vidual’s private delight takes care of the world. This caretaking 
34	 In speaking of a “Ruskinian economics of scarcity” I do not wish to dispute Sher-
burne’s argument that Ruskin’s economic thought is notable for its logic of abundance. 
I hope to show that while Ruskin’s work expresses an expectation of abundance in the 
near future, it also expresses an important perception of immediate scarcity, and that 
this perception arises in part from his understanding of spending as (in Sherburne’s 
words) “an end in itself, or a means to consumption” rather than, as the economists 
would have it, part of “the smooth functioning of the economic machine,” or “a means 
to the circulation of currency and trade” (Sherburne, John Ruskin or the Ambiguities of 
Abundance, p. 145).
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occurs via an unexplained mechanism by which “enjoyment 
radiates.” If Will’s position seems insufficiently explained, or 
if his statement that in enjoying oneself one is “doing the most 
. . . to save the earth’s character as an agreeable planet” seems 
not just intellectually lazy but morally repulsive, then it should 
be remembered that his words are the outburst of a young man 
frustrated by the general renunciatory coolness of the woman 
he adores. Eliot’s narrator notes that Will speaks “impetuously” 
here (p. 214), and he himself says shortly after these remarks, 
“I have a hyperbolical tongue” (p. 216). We might also attribute 
his comments here to his status at this point in the novel as a 
rather dilettantish artist.
Still, Will Ladislaw’s views may not be too far from George 
Eliot’s own. Felix Holt, possessed of a more tempered tongue 
than Will, is a more rational voice for his author, and in “The 
Address to Working men, by Felix Holt” (1868) his calm voice 
offers views that correspond with those expressed in Will’s out-
burst. Felix Holt describes to his audience of laborers “the trea-
sure of refined needs.”35 This is the “treasure of knowledge, sci-
ence, poetry, refinement of thought, feeling, and manners, great 
memories and the interpretation of great records” (“Address to 
Working men,” p. 425). Though we may infer that this treasure 
is expensive, it is “distinct from the indulgences of luxury and 
the pursuit of vain finery.” Felix does not explain where exactly 
this distinction lies, but he does note in passing that the treasure 
includes “no smart furniture and no horses” (p. 425).
In having perpetuity and continuity as part of its essence, 
the vast conglomerate treasure that Felix describes is similar to 
the collective wealth of art that Ruskin wishes to see preserved in 
his atemporal permanent economy. Like that body of work, it is 
a treasure “carried on from the minds of one generation to the 
minds of another,” and, Felix tells his auditors, it is “your own 
35	 George Eliot, “The Address to Working men, by Felix Holt” (1868), in Essays 
of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney (New york: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963), p. 426. 
Subsequent citations in the text refer to this edition. The “Address to Working men” 
is an essay written in the voice of the hero of Eliot’s 1866 political novel, Felix Holt, the 
Radical. Critics have debated the degree to which Felix speaks for Eliot (see Henry, 
“George Eliot and Politics”; and Thomas Pinney’s introduction to the essay in Essays of 
George Eliot, p. 415).
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inheritance and the inheritance of your children” (“Address to 
Working men,” pp. 425, 426). Like Ruskin, Felix is above all 
wary of destruction and change. He decries the misperception 
that “the preservation of order is the part of a selfish aristocracy 
and a selfish commercial class” (“Address to Working men,” 
p. 424). Felix echoes Ruskin’s evocation of the “great recipro-
cal duties . . . constantly exchanged between the living and the 
dead” (The Political Economy of Art, p. 63), when Felix speaks of 
the “law by which human lives are linked together” and claims 
that this law means that “we who are living now are sufferers by 
the wrong-doing of those who lived before us; we are sufferers 
by each other’s wrong doing; and the children who come after 
us are and will be sufferers from the same causes” (“Address to 
Working men,” p. 419).
Felix acknowledges that the treasure he describes “is bound 
up at present with conditions which have much evil in them,” 
and that “one of the hardships in the lot of working men is that 
they have been for the most part shut out from sharing in this 
treasure” (“Address to Working men,” p. 425). He admits to his 
auditors that “the common estate of society has been anything 
but common to you” (p. 426), and notes: “we, by the very fact 
of our privations, our lack of leisure and instruction, are not 
so likely to be aware of and take into our account” the “many 
precious benefits” of this treasure (p. 425). Someone who does 
have access to this treasure, he says, will find that “it can make 
a man’s life very great, very full of delight, though he has no 
smart furniture and no horses: it also yields a great deal of dis-
covery that corrects error, and of invention that lessens bodily 
pain, and must at last make life easier for all” (p. 425). In mak-
ing scientific discovery part of the treasure, Felix goes some way 
toward implying how the treasure “must at last make life easier 
for all”; it is less clear, however, how the “poetry” or the “refine-
ment of thought, feeling, and manners,” to which only a small 
slice of the population has access, might eventually improve 
the general well-being.
George Eliot, through Felix, offers the treasure of refined 
needs as the reason not to redistribute wealth more equitably 
in the present or the immediate future and, by extension, the 
reason that those who have wealth may spend it on themselves, 
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administering to their own refined needs. Echoing Ruskin 
again in his emphasis on preservation and stasis, Felix tells his 
listeners: “the security of this treasure demands, not only the 
preservation of order, but a certain patience on our part with 
many institutions and facts of various kinds, especially touch-
ing the accumulation of wealth” (“Address to Working men,” 
p. 425). Felix warns the crowd that they must not cause the 
classes holding the treasure “to withdraw from public affairs”; 
they must not “stop too suddenly any of the sources by which 
their leisure and ease are furnished, rob them of the chances 
by which they may be influential and pre-eminent” (p. 426) 
To thus claim wealth or power from the classes that currently 
maintain a grip on them, he asserts, is to “injure your own in-
heritance and the inheritance of your children” (p. 426). The 
treasure that benefits all humanity happens to be held by a few, 
and, for the moment, it must be held in absolute security to 
ensure its preservation.
Will’s and Felix’s speeches may be taken to explain each 
other. In the model presented by each of them, one individu-
al’s enjoyment of resources or wealth denied to others is part 
of a system within which those others are somehow cared for. 
The immured treasure radiates a glow outside its protecting 
walls, and the very fact of its safety improves the lives of those 
who will never come near it. Ruskin describes a similar treasure 
in The Political Economy of Art when he urges accumulation and 
preservation rather than destruction and supersession; he re-
minds his auditors that existing art should not be replaced by 
new art, but that the art of successive generations “should all 
grow together into one mighty temple” (The Political Economy 
of Art, p. 64). In Will’s and Felix’s visions, however, many are 
left outside the temple, and we may wonder just who is allowed 
inside to feel and meet needs refined to such beneficent ef-
fect. Dorothea, as heiress to a fortune and an estate, seems like 
a good candidate for entry into the temple: she is favored by 
the “many institutions and facts of various kinds” or the “condi-
tions which have much evil in them,” which Felix says protect 
the treasure. But, as we have seen, Dorothea cannot comfort-
ably enjoy, because she cannot forget the pain of others: she 
refuses to give herself over to pleasure, and insists on standing 
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outside the temple. In “The Address to Working men” and in 
Middlemarch, the moment of enjoyment—or consumption—is 
systematically dislocated from the immediate, either deferred 
into the future or deflected onto others. This persistent post-
ponement of pleasure recalls the conclusion of Unto This Last, 
where Ruskin announces: “Luxury is indeed possible in the fu-
ture—innocent and exquisite; luxury for all, and by the help of 
all; but luxury at present can only be enjoyed by the ignorant; 
the cruelest man living could not sit at his feast, unless he sat 
blindfold” (Unto This Last, p. 114).
Will and Felix are both reforming political men devoted 
to improving the lives of the poor and the powerless. yet these 
political reformers serve as the voices for a societal ideal that 
valorizes the preservation of accumulated wealth and existing 
structures of power. Through these characters, revolutionary 
ardor is safely reabsorbed into conservatism. Critics sometimes 
read Middlemarch as a triumphantly bourgeois novel that de-
picts Dorothea’s progress from her old inherited estate into the 
modern middle class, where she will be the supportive wife of an 
“ardent public man” who works for reform in a representative 
democratic system; as a good bourgeoise, Dorothea “will learn 
what everything costs” and participate in the modern industrial 
economy (Middlemarch, pp. 822, 801). But as an “ardent public 
man,” Will is relatively impotent. We know his ardor to be in 
vain before he even begins to exercise it, when the narrator 
speaks of him “working well in those times when reforms were 
begun with a young hopefulness of immediate good which has 
been much checked in our days” (p. 822). Will’s foray into 
reforming representative government is followed in the next 
generation by his son’s return to Dorothea’s hereditary home 
and rank: Tipton Grange, we learn, is “inherited by Dorothea’s 
son, who might have represented middlemarch, but declined, 
thinking that his opinions had less chance of being stifled if he 
remained out of doors” (p. 824). The hopeful public-minded 
father of the 1830s is replaced in the 1860s by his more cynical 
and more privately oriented son.
Middlemarch does not in the end represent the bourgeoi-
sie ascendant; instead, it represents the perpetuation of a line 
and the retention of property within a family of good blood. 
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Symbolically speaking, Dorothea’s decision to marry Will is not 
primarily an embrace of political reform that will redistribute 
power and wealth, nor is it primarily a commitment to join the 
modern consumer economy. Quite to the contrary, it is for her 
a renunciation of the sort that she has always liked making. Her 
way of telling Will that she will marry him is to say, “I don’t mind 
about poverty—I hate my wealth”; a few moments later she adds: 
“We could live quite well on my own fortune—it is too much—
seven hundred a-year—I want so little—no new clothes—and I 
will learn what everything costs” (Middlemarch, p. 801). Critics 
have argued that this promise to learn what everything costs is 
Dorothea’s promise to purchase her way into bourgeois domes-
ticity.36 But its more obvious implied meaning is far more rel-
evant: Dorothea is simply promising to consume less.
The habits of consumption that fuel a modern industrial 
economy driven by the insatiable desires of a credit-spending 
middle class are represented in Middlemarch by Lydgate and Ro-
samond. yet these are not the habits that rise triumphant at the 
novel’s end. Rather, Dorothea’s Ruskinian economics of philan-
thropy and renunciation dominate the close of the story. And 
with her son’s inheritance of Tipton Grange and his decision 
not to participate in national government, the Ruskinian politics 
that honor hereditary wealth and power win out over the repre-
sentative democratic politics of reform that so briefly and so de-
ceptively flourish during Will’s career. The domination of Rus-
kinian economics within the novel means that an archaic feudal 
relation between the powerful and the less powerful persists.
The scene in which Dorothea pledges herself to Will 
closely resembles its analogue in Felix Holt, the Radical, where 
Esther Lyon pledges herself to the eponymous radical.37 In 
36	 Freedgood writes: “Dorothea’s promise to understand value in the rationalized 
terms of money is of course the key to her descent (which in the novel’s thematic terms 
is an ascent) into the middle class” (The Ideas in Things, p. 119). Frank Christianson 
also reads Dorothea’s words to signal an entry into the middle class and to emphasize 
“the economic cast of their engagement,” allowing them to “represent a model of mod-
ern philanthropy” (Christianson, Philanthropy in British and American Fiction: Dickens, 
Hawthorne, Eliot, and Howells [Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2007], p. 157).
37	 yeazell argues that “social and political anxieties are contained” in the courtship 
plots of political novels. She sees Felix Holt exchange “a narrative that threatens drastic 
change for one that proves reassuringly static” (“Why Political Novels Have Heroines,” 
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both novels, the sign of a woman’s moral quality is her deci-
sion to abstain from consuming by marrying a poor man who 
will devote his life to promoting a more equitable distribution 
of wealth in society. And in both novels, the ardent political 
groom has views that actually commit him to the conservation 
of the existing order rather than the redistribution he stands 
for. Politics and economic consumption intermingle in these 
plots because, for George Eliot, the question of consumption 
is a question about one’s obligations to other people. Having 
taught us to feel for others, Eliot faces the problem of marking 
out a line at which we can cease to do so. She asks us to under-
stand that when we spend money, we least provisionally mark 
out that line, whether we intend to or not.
We can read Will’s statement about enjoyment as setting 
out an upper limit at which sympathy may legitimately end. This 
limit is the aesthetic pleasure found in “refinement.” Beauty, 
especially beauty that provides “intellectual or emotional” plea-
sure, gives us license finally to stop listening to the roar of hu-
man pain that always lies on the other side of silence. This is 
a very uncomfortable limit to set—for us, and also for George 
Eliot. Through the end of Middlemarch, even after an education 
into greater aesthetic and political-economic knowledge, part 
of Dorothea’s nobility remains her continuing insistence upon 
renunciation. She never develops a habit of enjoying the plea-
sures of the immense expense of art, because she cannot for-
get the pain of others. The only evidence that she ever follows 
Will’s injunction to enjoy is that she makes him her husband; 
her marriage is in that sense her one self-gratifying act.
Even as George Eliot and Ruskin propose that, for now, 
existing concentrations of wealth and power must be protected 
so that the treasure of art may continue to be enjoyed, they im-
plicitly or explicitly endorse a habit of self-denial that prohib-
its or discourages such enjoyment. They echo the eighteenth-
century moral philosophers in presenting the category of the 
p. 127). Elliott sees a different model for containment in the novel’s conclusion: she 
notes that political wives were becoming important during the 1860s, and argues that 
Dorothea projects her ambitions onto Will, so that “she can still share them by becom-
ing one with him in marriage” (The Angel out of the House, p. 212).
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aesthetic as a means of legitimizing select modes of consump-
tion; but for them, as for Dorothea, this strategy for regulation 
ultimately fails. Both Eliot and Ruskin suggest that, for the sake 
of authentic pleasure in what is called art, we may in good con-
science temporarily forget the pain of others—but neither au-
thor is willing to follow through on this suggestion. Ruskin will 
not cleanly separate art from luxury, and George Eliot will not 
have her modern Theresa do the forgetting that she declares 
permissible. The author of Middlemarch makes aesthetic plea-
sure a point at which we may legitimately stop sympathizing, 
but she stops far short of telling us that we must do so, and she 
gives us instead a smart, serious heroine who would not dream 
of it. Dorothea’s anxiety about consumption is never resolved, 
and neither, perhaps, is George Eliot’s.
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Emily Coit, “‘This Immense Expense of Art’: George Eliot and John 
Ruskin on Consumption and the Limits of Sympathy” (pp. 214–245)
This essay attempts to better our understanding of George Eliot’s conservatism by ex-
amining a body of ideas about consumption and moral obligation that she and John 
Ruskin share. I use a discussion of consumer ethics to explore the moral logic of their 
conservatism by examining the role of the aesthetic within it. Economic consumption 
and the aesthetic are subjects inextricably connected, not just because the discourses 
of political economy and aesthetics have a shared origin in eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, but also because the discourse of aesthetics has long served to legitimize se-
lect modes and acts of consumption. By marking out a limit where one may reasonably 
cease to sympathize and instead devote energy (and money) to personal gratification, 
the treatment of consumption in George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871) offers an impor-
tant articulation of moral thought. Eliot suggests that aesthetic pleasure can make con-
sumption morally defensible, but she also anticipates Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of the 
aesthetic: her novel represents both the display of cultural capital and the exercise of 
the aesthetic disposition as ways of maintaining social and economic hierarchies. She 
thus at once critiques and participates in the system within which the aesthetic func-
tions to preserve social and political stasis. Using John Ruskin’s economic writings to 
expose Middlemarch as a novel of consumer ethics, this essay examines Eliot’s represen-
tation of personal economic consumption as an emergent mode of social and political 
agency that might operate productively within that stasis. 
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